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Abstract 
When shareholders of target companies get paid with stock, they may 
face an increased risk of expropriation by becoming minority 
shareholders in a new company. Thus, when target shareholders receive 
bids from companies regulated by countries with weaker investor 
protection, their propensity to accept stock as part of considerations will 
be lower. To test this intuitive prediction, we look at acquisitions by 
companies from 38 countries with varying degrees of investor protection. 
The results show a positive relationship between investor protection and 
the fraction of stock in the method of payment in acquisitions. 
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One of the key aspects of corporate acquisitions is how the acquired company's shareholders 
("target") are paid. Much of the research on payment choice has focused on the motivations 
and drivers of the acquiror. However, the preferences of the target shareholders have not 
received as much attention. In this thesis, we flip the focus to the target's perspective.  
Earlier ways of looking at the value of securities have been largely shaped by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), focusing on the cash flows, capital structure and leverage. However, the rights 
brought to owners beyond the right to the company's cash flows are also important to the value 
of the securities, according to Hart (1995). 
These rights will vary across countries, based on the laws and enforcement in their respective 
jurisdictions. To measure this, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) 
examine the strength of investor protection of minority shareholders and the risk of 
expropriation by majority shareholders and management ("insiders"). They create a 
framework to assess the rights of shareholders, creditors, and the rule of law in 49 countries. 
The effect of investor protection can be observed in multiple factors. Two examples are that 
countries with stronger investor protection are observed to have higher GDP growth (Haidar, 
2009) and higher corporate valuations (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
2002). 
The financing decision in corporate acquisitions is important as it can significantly impact 
important factors such as the corporate control, financial position, and tax liabilities of the firm 
and its shareholders. This affects both the bidder and the target firm. Faccio and Masulis 
(2005) examine the choice of payment method for European firms between 1997 and 2000. 
They find that dilution of dominant shareholders, the ability to pay in cash, and information 
asymmetry between the bidder and the target are powerful determinants for the method of 
payment. 
We explore how different levels of investor protection affect the payment method in M&A 
transactions. Our intuition is that acquirors from countries with weaker protection of minority 
shareholders must pay more in cash due to a higher risk of expropriation, making stock 
compensation less attractive for target shareholders. 
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We test if higher levels of investor protection in the country of the acquiror increase the target 
shareholders' propensity to accept stock as a form of compensation in acquisitions. We analyse 
6,851 transactions from 37 countries from 1990 to 2020 using OLS and probit regression. 
Additionally, we look at how the method of payment is affected by legal origins, cross-border, 
and cross-industry transactions. The results show that investor protection positively affects the 
fraction of stock used as part of considerations in takeovers. Furthermore, the effect increases 
significantly in cross-border transactions.  
We build on the research by La Porta et al. (1998) and use the same framework, extending it 
to the method of payment. We contribute to the existing literature on the method of payment 
in M&A transactions by showing that higher levels of investor protection positively affect 
stock as a part of the method of payment in corporate acquisitions. The results also contribute 
to the literature on investor protection by showing its effect on additional areas within finance. 
We are not aware of any extant research examining the impact of investor protection on the 
method of payment in acquisitions. 
We structure the thesis into seven sections, excluding the bibliography and the appendix. In 
section 1, we give a brief overview of the research subject, method, and findings. In section 
2, we go over the key literature we use to build our hypotheses and analysis. In section 3, we 
state our beliefs and formulate the hypothesis used in the analysis. In section 4, we discuss 
the data, sample selection, and variables. In section 5, we discuss the methodology used in 
the analysis. In section 6, we perform our regression analysis and discuss our findings. In 
section 7, we wrap up and conclude with the results of the paper. 
 
 8
2. Literature review 
This section reviews the existing literature on the effects of investor protection and on what 
impacts the choice of the method of payment in acquisitions. There is extensive research on 
investor protection and how it affects multiple areas relating to finance.  
The research on the method of payment has been explored in multiple papers and helped us 
understand important factors to look at when doing our analysis. We have gained a greater 
understanding of other important factors that affect the payment method from these papers. 
2.1 Investor protection 
Previous research literature has shown the importance of the legal protection of investors to 
countries' financial markets and the pricing of securities. The literature indicates that the 
increased risk of expropriation is the cause. 
Laying the basis for much of the literature, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998) examine laws and enforcement covering shareholders and creditors across 49 countries. 
In their paper, they created a framework used to compare countries' level of investor 
protection. The framework has three main categories: Shareholder rights, Creditor rights, and 
Rule of law. We present the framework and its parts here but will describe them in more detail 
in section 4.5. 
The shareholder rights award one point for each of the following laws that exist in the country: 
proxy by mail allowed, shares not blocked before meeting, cumulative voting, oppressed 
minority, preemptive right to new issues, percentage of share of capital to call an extraordinary 
shareholder meeting, and mandatory dividends. La Porta et al. (1998) used the composite of 
these to rank the strength of minority shareholders across the 49 countries. These shareholder 
rights serve to limit the control of insiders and align their interests with shareholders. 
Creditor rights cover the protections of creditors. The authors looked at laws that align the 
interest of insiders to that of lenders. The creditor rights consist of the following variables: No 
automatic stay on assets, secured creditors first paid, restrictions for going into reorganisation, 
and management does not stay in reorganisation. In the same way as the shareholder rights, 
the creditor rights are scored based on the existence of the rule in the relevant country and 
given a composite score. 
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The authors examine rule of law, which was comprised of the following variables: efficiency 
of judicial system, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, and accounting standards. 
These are ranked on a scale from zero to ten, with higher levels representing more favourable 
environments to investors. 
La Porta et al. (1998) find that both laws and enforcement differ significantly across countries, 
with the most favourable environments for investors in countries of common law origins and 
least favourable in French civil law countries. The paper shows that the relative strength of 
shareholders and creditors are consistent across legal origins and that both are significantly 
stronger in common law countries. 
There are additional ways in which poor investor protection have negatively affected countries 
and minority shareholders. La Porta et al. (1997) show that the countries with the weakest 
investor protection have smaller capital markets than countries with higher levels of investor 
protection. The authors find that French civil law countries stand out as having both the 
weakest investor protection and the least developed capital markets, especially compared to 
common law countries.  
Haidar (2009) examines the relationship between investor protection and economic growth, 
looking at more than 170 countries. The paper finds that countries with stronger investor 
protection tend to grow faster than those with weaker investor protection and that measures of 
disclosures and transparency had an especially strong effect. This shows that investor 
protection affects multiple country-level variables and is important to the economic 
development of countries. 
Moreover, it is not only at the country level that we see these effects. Goyal and Muckley 
(2013) show that investor rights influence dividend decisions in Asia. This indicates that 
countries with higher levels of investor protection lead to a greater tendency for firms to pay 
dividends to shareholders. The paper studies the importance of investor rights in decisions on 
dividend policy in Asia, with a sample of almost 53,000 firm years. It finds that creditors do 
impact the payout decision-making process but that the agency costs of equity predominate. 
Common law counties show a greater tendency to pay dividends and tend to pay more.  
Further, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) shows the effects on 
corporate valuation, looking at a sample of 539 companies from 27 wealthy nations. The paper 
examines the effects of investor protection and cash-flow ownership by a controlling 
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shareholder on firm valuations. They found that investor protection impacts the valuation of 
companies, rewarding strong investor protection with higher firm valuation. 
La Porta et al. (1998) relate their findings on expropriation and investor protection to Jensen 
and Meckling's (1976) description of insiders, where the law aspect has a significant bearing 
on agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) study the agency theory, the theory of property 
rights, and the theory of finance to develop a theory of firms ownership structure. They focus 
on the agency relationship between the principals and agents, and the concept of separating 
ownership and control. One of their findings is that agency cost depends on the statutory and 
common law, which is particularly relevant to our thesis. 
This ties in with what we posit about investor protection, that shareholders by law are more 
aligned with the insiders of the firm in countries with stronger investor protection. Minority 
shareholders especially have an even bigger challenge in ensuring that management act in their 
best interest. Thus, policies that align management and owners by law are likely to benefit the 
minority shareholders. 
In this section, we covered previous literature and found that investor protection is affecting 
countries economically. We find that countries with higher levels of investor protection 
positively affect the GDP growth, company valuations, and the payout of firms. Additionally, 
financial markets tend to be bigger and more developed than those of countries with weaker 
investor protection. 
2.2 Method of payment 
Mergers and acquisitions are important strategic events for both the acquiring and target firm. 
One of the key decisions managers have to make is the method of payment, usually consisting 
of cash, stock or a mix. There are both internal and external factors affecting the payment 
choice due to stakeholders with different incentives. 
Understanding the intrinsic value of the stock of the acquiring company and information 
asymmetry is a central part of the method of payment theory. Focusing on information 
asymmetry, Hansen (1987) presents a theory that firms are more likely to use stock to mitigate 
the riskiness of the target firm. In his paper, he creates a model for the choice of payment 
method in M&A transactions, with adverse selection being the main component. Hansen 
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(1987) finds that acquirors are incentivised to offer stock in cases where the target knows its 
value better than the acquiror because it has desirable contingent-pricing characteristics. 
Eckbo, Makaew, and Thorburn (2018) examine whether bidders are opportunistic in their use 
of stock as the method of payment, exploiting informational asymmetries between the bidder 
and target. The authors analyse a sample of 6200 takeover bids with US targets and acquirors, 
using proxies that decrease the informational asymmetry between bidder and target. They find 
that the main drivers of the method of payment decision are capital structure considerations, 
external pressures to pay in cash, and bidder concerns with adverse selection. They find no 
significant evidence of bidder opportunism. They also find that more stock is used when 
targets know more about the bidder. 
Several papers examine the effect of cross-border and cross-industry transactions. These are 
cases where the information asymmetry and uncertainty are expected to be higher. 
Dutta, Saadi and Zhu (2013) find that cross-border transactions tend to have a higher share of 
cash as a part of considerations compared to domestic transactions. They do this by examining 
1300 completed M&A transactions by Canadian acquirors between 1993 and 2002. They 
examine stock payment's role in alleviating the impact of information asymmetry that one can 
expect to arrive from cross-border transactions. Their results show that using stock in cross-
border transactions when acquiring companies in countries with lower corporate governance 
ratings is a way to reduce informational asymmetry. In addition, they find that markets tend 
to initially react positively to stock-financed cross-border transactions, overestimating the 
value-add. However, these deals significantly underperform cash-financed cross-border 
transactions in the long run.  
Faccio and Masulis' (2005) findings support Dutta et al. (2012), showing that cross-border and 
cross-industry transactions are much more likely to be cash-financed. They argue that 
increased uncertainty causes this effect. They studied the payment choices of European bidders 
between 1997 and 2000 and made multiple findings regarding the method of payment. They 
find that bidders will avoid using stock if it threatens to dilute the voting power of their 
dominant shareholders. The bidders' access to cash or debt financing is a significant predictor 
for cash financed acquisitions. Additionally, they propose that targets might be more inclined 
to accept stock if they can benefit by deferring taxes or that they might prefer cash to avoid 
the risk of becoming a minority owner in a company with concentrated ownership. 
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These findings seem to reflect Hansen's (1987) findings that the share of stock as a part of 
total acquisition consideration increases with uncertainty. It is possible that companies 
favouring stock in cross-border transactions have greater knowledge about the industry and 
country in which they operate. However, these papers mainly focus on the decisions made by 
the acquiror. We look at the preference for the method of payment from the target's 
perspective. 
Burch, Nanda and Silveri (2012) examine the method of payment choice from the target 
shareholders point of view. They use the target shareholders' tax liability and investment style 
– defined as growth vs value, where growth stocks are riskier– as proxies. The paper has a 
sample of 1881 completed and failed M&A transactions between 1981 and 2006. Burch et al. 
(2012) find that higher shareholder tax liabilities lead to lower bids and a higher preference 
for stock as payment method.  
We find that many factors influence the method of payment decision. Some of these are the 
bidders' ability to offer cash, the impact on current dominant shareholders' voting power in the 
bidder firm, and information asymmetry between the acquiror and target. The information 
asymmetry is especially prominent in cross-border and cross-industry transactions, which are 




3. Empirical testing strategy 
We propose that there is a positive relationship between the use of stock in corporate 
acquisitions and the level of investor protection in the country of the acquiror. This is because 
investors want to avoid the risk of expropriation by insiders (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998), and 
that investor protection increases the likelihood of this happening. We suggest that this 
aversion to risk of expropriation is expressed through an unwillingness to accept stock as a 
method of payment from companies subject to weaker investor protection. Using the same 
variables as La Porta et al. (1998): Shareholder rights around the world and rule of law, we 
will assess whether these factors affect the method of payment. Our overarching research 
question is: 
"Does higher levels of investor protection in the country of the acquiror increase the target's 
propensity to accept stock as a form of compensation in acquisitions?" 
From this, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
H0: The use of stock as payment in takeovers is independent of the level of investor protection 
in the acquirer nation 
H1: The use of stock as payment in takeovers increases with the level of investor protection in 
the acquirer nation 
To answer this, we look at the research question from different angles.  
Focusing on a high-level picture, we can see how common law countries measure up against 
countries of other origins. We look at this because there is clear evidence that common law 
countries generally have better protection than civil law ones (La Porta et al., 1998). We also 
look at the different legal origins to see their effects on investor protection and method of 
payment.   
Dutta et al. (2012) show that cross-border payments are more likely to be financed by cash. 
They study acquisitions by Canadian firms, a country with good investor protection. We test 
if their findings also hold for countries where investor protection is weaker. Similarly, the 
paper by Faccio and Masulis (2005) finds evidence that the cash component is higher for cross-
border transactions than domestic ones. Their papers looked at acquisitions by European firms. 
Since there is greater uncertainty with being acquired by a foreign firm, we propose that risk 
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factors such as investor protection will be paid greater attention to in these offers. We, 
therefore, look at how cross-border payments impacts the effect of investor protection on the 
method of payment.  
Faccio and Masulis (2005) also find that the stock portion of considerations in transactions 
within the same industry is higher than that of cross-industry transactions. Our economic 
intuition is that risk factors such as investor protection become more apparent when acquiring 
a company from a different industry. We, therefore, look at the impact of cross-industry on 
the effect of investor protection on the method of payment.  
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4. Data 
In this section, we describe the data used in the analysis and the data sources. We also describe 
the sample selection process and how the variables are created.  
4.1 Transaction data 
We obtain the M&A data from Refinitiv SDC Platinum Financial Securities Data. We select 
data for all transactions from 1990 to 2020. Both US and non-US targets are selected as well 
as all sectors. The independent variables are sourced from the framework put forth by La Porta 
et al. (1998). For the analysis, we assume that the proxies used by La Porta et al. (1998) hold 
for the entire dataset, i.e., that the measurements of investor protection also apply for 
transactions in later years. Therefore, we treat the data as cross-sectional data. After 
performing sample selection, our dataset consists of 6,851 transactions from 37 countries. The 
variable we want to analyse is the portion of stock as a percentage of total considerations.  
Table 1 
Country distribution of acquisitions and payment method  
Acquiror nation Count % Stock SD % stock Deal Size Premium 
United States 3266 0.5 0.47 2400 0.38 
Japan 738 0.43 0.49 437 0.18 
Canada 648 0.68 0.44 789 0.4 
Australia 413 0.6 0.46 858 0.31 
United Kingdom 367 0.46 0.46 2101 0.3 
France 153 0.3 0.45 3380 0.31 
Germany 104 0.22 0.4 3728 0.3 
South Korea 98 0.69 0.46 424 0.07 
India 96 0.62 0.49 459 0.16 
Malaysia 92 0.24 0.43 100 0.13 
Switzerland 88 0.17 0.36 4288 0.36 
Singapore 86 0.4 0.48 266 0.15 
South Africa 77 0.46 0.49 503 0.24 
Taiwan 73 0.63 0.48 308 0.2 
Sweden 67 0.45 0.48 713 0.28 
Brazil 60 0.51 0.49 1404 0.29 
Italy 48 0.48 0.49 1704 0.25 
Netherlands 47 0.4 0.47 6510 0.35 
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Spain 39 0.42 0.47 4490 0.13 
Norway 38 0.27 0.43 399 0.14 
Thailand 38 0.26 0.45 383 0.16 
Finland 31 0.42 0.48 1091 0.31 
Israel 31 0.39 0.46 2039 0.28 
Belgium 25 0.29 0.39 7230 0.3 
Mexico 19 0.19 0.39 2793 0.25 
Colombia 15 0.2 0.41 197 0.59 
Chile 14 0.31 0.46 912 0.14 
Greece 13 0.62 0.51 507 0.16 
New Zealand 13 0.38 0.47 119 0.36 
Turkey 13 0.54 0.52 98 0.02 
Denmark 12 0.25 0.45 1182 0.41 
Austria 11 0.22 0.4 3133 0.5 
Argentina 5 0 0 148 -0.04 
Egypt 5 0.15 0.33 276 0.01 
Peru 5 0.6 0.55 165 0.37 
Portugal 2 0 0 373 0.19 
Nigeria 1 0  60 1.62 
Full sample 6851 0.49 0.48 1809 0.32 
The table shows the number of transactions by the different acquiror nations in the 
sample. The columns display the mean percentage of stock used in considerations and 
their respective standard deviations. Also included are the mean deal sizes as well as 
the mean offer premium 
Summary statistics of our financial data can be seen in table 1. Transactions with US acquirors 
make up approximately half of all observations. Stock as a percentage of total compensation 
varies notably across countries, although the standard deviation stays relatively consistent for 
nations with a greater number of observations. The average percentage of stock in the dataset 
is 49 %. We note that among the countries with at least 30 transactions, the countries with the 
highest fraction stock are: South Korea, Canada, Taiwan, India, and Australia. These represent 
the three largest legal origins, English common law, French civil law, and German civil law. 
Similarly, the countries with the lowest fraction stock are also from different legal origins. 
These countries are Switzerland, Germany, France, Malaysia, Thailand, and Norway. 
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4.2 Measurement of investor protection 
The independent variables we want to use in the analysis are the different measurements put 
forth by La Porta et al. (1998). We will use these measurements as independent variables in 
the analysis. The variables that focus on creditors' protection are excluded since, intuitively, 
this is not of interest to minority shareholders. Thus, we are left with 16 variables, 6 of which 
are dummy variables.  
Table 2 
Country overview of investor protection. 
 
Nation Rule of law Shareholder rights Accounting standards Investor protection 
Canada 5 47.88 74 0.88 
United Kingdom 5 47.01 78 0.87 
United States 5 47.61 71 0.87 
Norway 4 49.59 74 0.81 
New Zealand 4 48.98 70 0.8 
Australia 4 46.5 75 0.78 
Japan 4 46.86 65 0.78 
Singapore 4 44.95 78 0.77 
South Africa 5 33.49 70 0.75 
Chile 5 33.87 52 0.74 
Sweden 3 48.98 83 0.73 
Finland 3 48.82 77 0.72 
India 5 30.61 57 0.72 
Malaysia 4 38.54 76 0.72 
Spain 4 39.35 64 0.71 
France 3 44.87 69 0.68 
Switzerland 2 49.96 68 0.64 
Taiwan 3 40.4 65 0.64 
Denmark 2 48.98 62 0.63 
Israel 3 38.94 64 0.63 
Netherlands 2 49.33 64 0.63 
Argentina 4 28.19 45 0.61 
Austria 2 47.36 54 0.61 
Portugal 3 39.03 36 0.61 
Brazil 3 32.31 54 0.56 
Colombia 3 28.3 50 0.53 
Germany 1 46.83 62 0.53 
Greece 2 34.19 55 0.5 
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South Korea 2 33.55 62 0.5 
Nigeria 3 22.7 59 0.49 
Peru 3 24.17 38 0.48 
Italy 1 39.73 62 0.47 
Thailand 2 29.67 64 0.47 
Belgium 0 47.43 61 0.45 
Turkey 2 27.31 51 0.44 
Egypt 2 26.89 24 0.41 
Mexico 1 29.96 60 0.38 
Full sample 3.05 39.54 61.97 0.64 
The table shows summary statistics of the acquiror nations included in the dataset and the 
independent variables that measure investor protection based on La Porta et al. (1998). It is 
sorted after the composite for investor protection. 
 
Table 2 shows the investor protections statistics by country. Worth noting is that the ten 
countries with the highest level of investor protection are dominated by English common law 
countries. Furthermore, seven out of the ten countries with the weakest investor protection are 
French civil law countries. Belgium is the only country with a score of zero for rule of law. 
Egypt has the lowest score for accounting standards with only 24, almost 38 points below the 
average of 61.97. Mexico is at the bottom of the list scoring below average for all variables.  
4.3 Sample selection 
To analyse the data, we perform a sample selection. The first step is to remove all transactions 
where data about the payment method is missing. We analyse the portion of stock as a 
percentage of the total compensation and limit the data to transactions that only use stock, 
cash, or a mix of the two. Therefore, only transactions where the percentage of cash and the 
percentage of stock adds up to 100 % of considerations are included.  
Second, we only include the transactions where the acquiror is from one of the 49 countries 
studied by La Porta et al. (1998). The countries are divided into English common law, French 
civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian civil law.  
The English-origin countries we include are Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, United Kingdom, United States, and Zimbabwe.  
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The French-origin countries are Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Egypt, 
France, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Mexico, Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, 
Spain, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
The German-origin countries are Austria, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, and 
Taiwan.  
The Scandinavian-origin countries are Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.  
Third, we remove all transactions where firms within Private Equity, Venture Capital, and 
Special Purpose Acquisition Vehicles are either on the buy or the sell-side. The reasoning 
behind this is that these firms have a limited ability to choose the method of payment (Eckbo, 
Makaew, & Thorburn, 2018). They are also involved in a large share of transactions which 
could skew the data and inference of the analysis.   
Fourth, we want to filter out transactions based on size. We, therefore, remove all transactions 
that have a deal size of less than $10 million. Furthermore, we filter out transactions where the 
deal size is less than 1 % of the acquirors' total assets. 
Fifth, we remove all observations that have missing values to ensure that the independent 
variables will work for all transactions and that all data have what is needed to be analysed. 
Lastly, we winsorize all the control variables by altering the top and bottom 2 % of values. 
This is done to deal with extreme values and provides less bias than removing the outliers 
outright.  
4.4 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the portion of stock as a percentage of the total payment. We create 
this variable by downloading data about the fractions of stock and cash that make up the total 
considerations in the transactions. The two values are combined so that all transactions have 
a fraction stock value on a spectrum from 0 to 1, where 1 is all-stock, and 0 is all-cash. We 
use the fraction stock variable when analysing with the OLS method. However, when using 
probit regression, we create a subset of the dataset where we only include values of 0 and 1. 
Thus, the dependent variable becomes a dummy variable. We argue that this is a sound way 
of analysing since 88 % of our observations are either all-cash or all-stock. 
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4.5 Independent variables 
The independent variables as described in 4.5.1 through 4.5.4 are used to test our hypothesis. 
The explanatory variables are based on La Porta et al. (1998). The variables consist of both 
dummy variables and indexes taken from different rating agencies. Sections 4.5.4 and 4.5.6 
describes how we have chosen to combine some of these variables into composites and 
interaction terms that we utilise in our regressions. We have also included control variables 
that have previously been shown to affect the method of payment which are described in 4.5.7. 
We have sourced this from the broader method of payment literature that we have cited in this 
paper, with particular attention paid to Eckbo et al. (2018). 
4.5.1 Shareholder rights 
The variable "shareholder rights" that we use throughout the analysis ranges from 0 to 6 and 
uses the sum of the dummy variables: proxy by mail allowed, shares not blocked before 
meeting, cumulative voting or proportional representation, oppressed minorities mechanism, 
and percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting if less than 10 %. 
The dummy variable "proxy by mail allowed" is equal to one if the country allows 
shareholders to mail in their proxy votes, zero otherwise. 
The dummy variable "shares not blocked before meeting" is equal to one if the country does 
not temporarily block shareholders from trading their stocks when they have been used for 
voting. 
The dummy variable "cumulative voting or proportional representation" equals one if the 
country allows shareholders to give all their votes to one candidate in elections for the board 
of directors. Also equal to one if minority shareholders have proportional representation in the 
board of directors, zero otherwise.  
The dummy variable "oppressed minorities mechanism" equals one if the country allows the 
minority shareholders to challenge the decisions of management in a judicial venue. Also 
equal to one if minority shareholders can require the company to purchase their shares in 
disputes about fundamental changes to the company such as mergers, asset dispositions, and 
changes in articles of incorporation. Minority shareholders in this setting refer to shareholders 
with a 10 % stake or less. 
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The dummy variable "preemptive rights" equals one if shareholders get the first opportunity 
to buy new issue of stock, and the right can only be waived by shareholder vote. 
The variable "percentage of share to call an extraordinary shareholders' meeting" ranges from 
1 % to 33 % and measures the minimum portion of shares that shareholders need to call an 
extraordinary shareholders' meeting. A point is awarded if shareholders can call an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting if they own 10 % or less. 
The variable "mandatory dividend" measures the percentage of net income that companies 
have to pay out as dividends and is expressed as this percentage. The variable is exclusively 
used in French civil law countries and is a mechanism introduced to make up for weaker 
investor protection of shareholders. 
We posit that higher levels of shareholder rights variables indicate better alignment of insiders 
and minority shareholders. Furthermore, this should lead to a lower risk of expropriation, 
which makes stock as payment method more attractive. 
4.5.2 Rule of Law 
The variable "rule of law" that we use throughout the analysis ranges from 0 to 50 and uses 
the sum of the variables: efficiency of judicial system, law and order, corruption, risk of 
expropriation, and repudiation of contracts by government. 
The variable "efficiency of judicial system" measures "efficiency and integrity of the legal 
environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms (La Porta et al., 1998). Lower 
scores entail lower efficiency. The index is made by the rating agency Business International 
Corp and uses the average between 1980 and 1983. The index ranges from 0 to 10.  
The variable "law and order" is an indicator of legal traditions in the nation. It is produced by 
the rating agency International Country Risk ("ICR"). ICR releases a monthly measurement 
of countries' law and order. La Porta et al. (1998) use the average of values from 1982 to 1995 
and ranks the countries on a scale from 0 to 10, where a lower score indicates weaker legal 
systems and enforcement of law and order.  
The variable "corruption" measures the corruption in the government of a nation as measured 
by the ICR. ICR releases a measurement of corruption monthly. La Porta et al. (1998) use the 
average of values from 1982 to 1995 and ranks the countries on a scale from 0 to 10, where a 
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lower score indicates a higher level of corruption. A lower corruption score implies that higher 
government officials are more susceptible to bribes and illegal payments in processes around 
licences for import and export, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, and loans. 
The variable "risk of expropriation" measures the "risk of outright confiscation or forced 
nationalisation" (La Porta et al., 1998). ICR releases a monthly measurement of countries' risk 
of expropriation. La Porta et al. (1998) use the average of values from 1982 to 1995 and ranks 
the countries on a scale from 0 to 10, where a lower score indicates a higher risk of 
expropriation. Expropriation is, in this case, defined as outright confiscation or forced 
nationalisation.  
The variable "repudiation of contracts by government" measures the risk of a modification in 
a contract taking the form of a repudiation, postponement, or scaling down due to budget 
cutbacks, indigenisation pressure, a change in government or a change in government 
economic and social priorities. ICR releases a monthly measurement of countries' risk of 
repudiation of contracts by government. La Porta et al. (1998) use the average of values from 
1982 to 1995 and ranks the countries on a scale from 0 to 10 where a lower score indicates a 
higher risks repudiation. 
We posit that higher levels of the rule of law variables indicate a strong system of legal 
enforcement, which reduces the riskiness and uncertainty related to all investments in the 
country. Such strong enforcement of the law could aid investors in cases where the insiders 
are abused by management (La Porta et al., 1998). In countries where the enforcement of the 
law is weaker, target shareholders should have a greater preference for cash. 
4.5.3 Accounting standards 
The final variable for investor protection is "accounting standards" and is measured by 
International Financial Analysis and Research. It measures companies' 1990 annual reports 
and examines 90 items split into seven categories. The categories are general information, 
income statement, balance sheet, funds flow statement, accounting standards, stock data, and 
special items. The index ranges from 0 to 100. It is a proxy to understand the transparency of 
accounting standards in the country, and while not a law, it is key for investors' understanding 
of securities. 
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We posit that higher levels of accounting standards increase the transparency of companies, 
which makes it easier to assess the value of a potential acquiror. This reduces uncertainty 
related to the value of the stock received in a potential acquisition, which increases the 
likelihood that target shareholders will accept stock. 
4.5.4 Investor protection 
We create a composite of the independent variables we have discussed above. This is done by 
giving each individual variable a weight of 1 for a combined 12 parts. Thus, our shareholder 
rights variables make up 6/12, rule of law 5/12, and accounting standards 1/12. We divide this 
by 12, turning the composite variable into a value between 0 and 1. Equal weight is used to 
allow for each variable to have an equal impact.  
We create this proxy to have one measurement of investor protection to simplify and make the 
interpretation of investor protection effects more intuitive. 
4.5.5 Control variables 
To examine the effect of the independent variables for investor protection, we need to control 
for other variables that are likely to impact payment method in acquisitions. Empirical 
evidence suggests that the main driver behind the choice of payment method is a combination 
of capital structure, external pressures to pay in cash, and bidder concern with adverse 
selection on the target side (Eckbo et al. 2018). Looking at these findings, we use the following 
control variables: Acquiror debt/assets, cash/book value, transaction value/acquiror enterprise 
value, dividend dummy, premium, and acquiror market/book. 
We use leverage and cash holding of the acquiror to measure the ability, or lack of ability, to 
pay targets in cash instead of stock. The rationale is that firms with lower leverage or higher 
deposits of cash have a higher ability to use cash as the method of payment. We also look at 
the relative size, as the deal size of cash-financed takeovers tends to be lower than that of 
stock-financed takeovers. This implicitly controls for the size of the acquiror, a characteristic 
that is positively correlated with stock-financed transactions. We include a dividend dummy 
that is equal to 1 if the target has paid dividends to its shareholders in the last year. This is to 
control for the target shareholders' preference for cash. The rationale behind including the 
premium is that if the acquiror prefers to pay with stock and the target wants to receive cash, 
the issue might be resolved by a sufficiently large premium. This can occur when the target 
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believes the acquiror's share price is overvalued. To control for the pricing of the acquiror, we 
include the market value to book value ratio. All control variables are explained in appendix 
1. 
4.5.6 Interaction terms 
We create interaction terms by combining the variables for investor protection and the dummy 
variables legal origin, cross-border, and cross-industry. Interaction terms highlight how the 
existence of one independent variable affects the magnitude and overall effect of another 
independent variable. We make these to identify conditions in which investor protection matter 
more to understand the dynamics between the variables. 
4.5.7 Correlation table 
We have included a correlation table of our key variables in appendix 2. This is done to gain 
a greater understanding of the data. We note the following correlations: 
The correlation between the variables shareholder rights and rule of law is 37 %. Although the 
two variables measure different factors that affect minority shareholders, it is surprising that 
the correlation is not higher. This could be explained by the fact that shareholder rights are 
laws created and implemented while the variable rule of law measure factors such as the 
efficiency of judicial systems and levels of corruption, i.e. factors that are more difficult to 
control.  
The correlation between investor protection and English-origin, French-origin, German-
origin, and Scandinavian-origin are 71 %, -54 %, -42 %, and -10 %. The ranking is expected 
and aligns with the findings of La Porta et al. (1998) that English-origin countries experience 
higher levels of investor protection.  
One thing that sticks out is that investor protection and shareholder rights have a correlation 
of 94 %. This is expected as shareholder rights make up half of the investor protection variable. 
However, this does not have an impact on our analysis as the two are not used in the same 
regressions.  
The correlation between investor protection and market value to book value is – 35 %. This is 
surprising and contradictory to the paper written by La Porta et al. (2002), where they found 
that higher levels of investor protection lead to higher valuations. However, the composite is 
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put together by multiple factors measuring investor protection, such as accounting standards, 
using a different dataset that includes more countries that could explain the results.  
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5. Methodology 
In this chapter, we explain the frameworks used in our analysis to answer our research 
question. We will explain the models we use for our data and our rationale for choosing the 
methods. 
5.1 OLS 
We use multiple regression to assess the effect of investor protection on the method of 
payment. We use two base models to which we add dummy variables and interaction terms. 
The two models are as follows: 
% 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠
+ 𝛽4𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
+ 𝛽5𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑡𝑜 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
+ 𝛽7𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽8𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 
+ 𝛽9𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖 
% 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
+ 𝛽3𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑡𝑜 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
+ 𝛽5𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽6𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 
+  𝛽7𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖 
We utilise OLS, a linear model, to analyse the change in fraction stock as part of total 
considerations on our independent variables. We argue that this model is suitable as the 
fraction stock variable is a continuous dependent variable. 
5.2 Probit analysis 
One of the methods we use to analyse our data is probit regression analysis. To fit the probit 
model, we make a subset containing only all-stock and all-cash considerations, which makes 
up about 88 % of the dataset. This is needed to use the probit method, which can be utilised 
when the dependent variable is a dummy variable. We use this to cross-check our OLS 
regression because the data is so heavily weighted at value 0 and 1. The probit regressions will 
all be shown in appendix 3 and 4.  
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Probit models are non-linear, and their predicted values are always equal to or between the 
values 0 and 1. The coefficient is expressed as an increased or decreased probability of a stock 
financed acquisition. Seeing it expressed in an increased or decreased likelihood, as opposed 
to a change in the linear relationship, is also an intuitive way to understand the effect. We use  
McFadden R2 to explain the magnitude of the deviation our independent variables.  
Interpretation of interaction terms differs for linear and non-linear models, as discussed by Ai 
and Norton (2003). They argue that we first have to compute the cross derivative or the cross 
difference of the coefficients to interpret them. Since we only use the probit models as a 
robustness test for OLS, we only interpret the coefficient's significance and direction rather 
than the odds-ratios that non-linear models provide.  
5.3 Clustered standard errors 
Clustering the standard errors makes sense, given that there is a correlation between the 
residuals within clusters and a correlation between regressors within clusters (Abadie, Athey, 
Imbens, & Woolridge, 2017). It is logical to assume that transaction characteristics for 
companies from the same country are similar, both in terms of regressors and the variance of 
the residuals. Utilising clustered standard errors is a solution to problems with both 
heteroscedasticity and arbitrary correlations of the error term within clusters (Heiss, 2016). 
Clustering has the same characteristics as cross-sectional data but is sampled from a population 
of clusters instead of being sampled individually from the population. Therefore, we cluster 




In this chapter, we present the findings from our analysis and our interpretations of the results. 
We will first go over some characteristics of the data before presenting OLS and probit 
regression results. 
6.1 Sample characteristics 
We begin by looking at the characteristics of our sample data. Here we divide it into legal 
origins, civil law and common law, as described by La Porta et al. (1998), and as it is the focal 
point of our hypothesis. 
Table 3 














Civil law 0.41 0.48 3.08 44.32 64.84 0.68 
Common 
law 
0.52 0.47 4.85 46.59 72.03 0.85 
Difference 0.11 -0.01 1.77 2.27 7.19 0.17 
The table shows the difference between civil law and common law countries. We look at the 
dependent variable fraction of stock as part of total considerations and the different 
measurements of investor protection, including the weighted composite. 
In table 3, we see that investor protection is stronger across all measurement categories in 
common law countries, in line with the findings of La Porta et al. (1998). This is shown 
together with the fraction of stock to highlight differences between our key independent 
variables and potential relationship with our dependent variable. The mean percentage of stock 
in transactions for common law nations is higher than for civil law countries by 11 percentage 
points. This initial look at the data seems to support our hypothesis in the sense that fraction 
of stock as part of considerations and levels of investor protection are correlated. Furthermore, 
the standard deviation is nearly the same for the two, even though the number of observations 
for common law is twice that of civil law. Although we see a difference in both the fraction 
stock and investor protection, the difference is not statistically significantly using a chi-
squared test.  
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Table 4 
Summary of investor protection and method of payment by legal origin 
Origin n 
Mean 











English 5128 0.52 0.47 4.85 46.59 72.03 0.85 
German 1112 0.42 0.49 3.3 45.51 64.58 0.71 
French 463 0.37 0.47 2.54 39.94 61.35 0.6 
Scandinavian 148 0.38 0.47 3.18 49.1 77.73 0.74 
The table shows the differences between the four law origins. We look at the characteristics 
of the dependent variable fraction of stock as part of total considerations and the different 
measurements of investor protection, including the weighted composite. 
Table 4 breaks down the data into the four law origins. English-origin countries score the 
highest for shareholder rights while maintaining the highest percentage of stock in their 
transactions, while Scandinavian-origin countries score the highest on both shareholder 
protection composite and accounting standards. The mean percentage of stock for 
Scandinavian-origin is the second-lowest, just ahead of French-origin countries. The French-
origin countries have the lowest share of stock as compensation while maintaining the lowest 
score in all measurements of investor protection.  
6.2 Regression 
In this section, we will present our findings from the OLS and probit regression. We use 
different proxies to test the hypothesis. For all tests, we show significance levels in the 






6.2.1 Investor protection 
Table 5 
Effects of investor protection on method of payment 
   OLS OLS Probit OLS Probit 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Shareholder 
Rights 
0.052*** 0.052*** 0.163***   
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.040)   
Rule of Law -0.005 -0.002 -0.005   
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.011)   
Accounting 
Standards 
0.003 0.0004 -0.002   
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.012)   
Investor 
Protection 
   0.457*** 1.318*** 




 0.298*** 0.978*** 0.299*** 0.979*** 
  (0.029) (0.097) (0.029) (0.097) 
Cash/Assets  -0.027 -0.061 -0.030 -0.065 
  (0.037) (0.108) (0.039) (0.113) 
Debt/Assets  0.071 0.202 0.074 0.221 
  (0.052) (0.146) (0.055) (0.154) 
Market/Book  0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 0.001* 
  (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) 
Offer Premium  -0.100*** -0.287*** -0.102*** -0.290*** 
  (0.021) (0.062) (0.020) (0.061) 
Dividend  -0.031 -0.096 -0.032 -0.101 
  (0.026) (0.080) (0.025) (0.077) 
Observations 6,851 6,851 6,040 6,851 6,040 
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.086  0.084  
McFadden R2   0.076  0.074 
F Statistic 
31.527*** (df 
= 3; 6847) 
72.611*** 












The table shows the results from the OLS regression of the dependent variable fraction of stock as a percentage 
of total compensation on different variables for investor protection and control variables. Column 1 uses only 
the three measurements of investor protection as explanatory variables to see their standalone effects. Columns 
2 and 3 use the same independent variables as column 1 and introduces control variables. Columns 4 and 5 use 
the weighted higher-level composite variable for investor protection as the explanatory variable and includes all 
the control variables. Additionally, columns 3 and 5 show probit regression utilising the dataset with all-cash 
and all-stock transactions.  
Results 
In this section of the analysis, we aim to test if investor protection impacts the method of 
payment. The fitted models obtain adjusted 𝑅2 values of 1.3 %, 8.6 %, 7.6 %, 8.4 %, and 7.4 
%, respectively.  
The variable shareholder rights positively affect the fraction of stock and is significant at the 
1 % level. A one-point increase in the shareholder rights variable – which takes a value 
between zero and six – will increase the stock portion of considerations in M&A transactions 
by 5.2 %, ceteris paribus. Shareholder rights measure the protection of minority shareholders. 
The results, therefore, give a clear indication that target shareholders are more willing to accept 
stock from companies subject to stronger investor protection. 
The regression shows that the weighted composite has a positive effect on the fraction of stock 
and is significant at the 1 % level. The composite variable for investor protection indicates that 
a one-unit increase in investor protection will lead to an increase in the fraction of stock in 
M&A payments of 45.7 %. However, as investor protection is a variable between 0 and 1, a 
more intuitive understanding is that a 1 % increase in investor protection leads to an increase 
in the fraction of stock by 0.457 %. 
Two of the control variables, transaction value to enterprise value and premium, have a 
statistically significant effect on the fraction of stock in opposite directions. A 1 % increase in 
relative size increases the stock portion by 0.298 % and 0.299 % for models 2 and 4, 
respectively. This is consistent with previous literature stating that larger firms prefer to pay 
with stock.  
The f-statistic is significant at the 1 % level for all OLS models, indicating that the models 
produce more accurate results than simply using the mean of the dependent variable. The f-
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statistic also indicates that the 𝑅2 is not equal to 0 and that there is a statistically significant 
correlation between the model and the dependent variable. 
We can reject the null hypothesis, which supports our alternative hypothesis that the use of 
stock as payment in takeovers increases with the level of investor protection in the acquiring 
nation. Considering findings from previous literature, it is surprising that we do not find more 
significant results for the control variables. Furthermore, the regressions show relatively low 
values for adjusted 𝑅2 indicating that there are other effects that we are not accounting for in 
the models. By consulting the correlation matrix in appendix 2, we see that the variables 
shareholder rights and the investor protection composite have a 94 % correlation. Similar 
results from the two variables are therefore expected. 
The results from probit regression indicate similar results in terms of significance levels and 
direction of coefficients. The models differ for the variable acquiror market to book value in 
column 5, considering it is significant at the 10 % level in the probit model.  
Due to a large number of US transactions, we also make a subsample of the data where US 
acquirors are excluded to test the robustness of the results. The number of observations 
decreases from 6,851 to 3,585. The model obtains very similar results. The table can be found 











6.2.2 Legal origins 
Table 6 
Effects of investor protection on method of payment – Legal origins 
 Common vs civil law       Origins 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mandatory Dividends   0.340** 0.151 
   (0.156) (0.193) 
Shareholder Rights 0.044**  0.028  
 (0.019)  (0.048)  
Rule of Law -0.014**  0.006  
 (0.006)  (0.006)  
Investor Protection  0.126  0.516* 
  (0.204)  (0.301) 
Common Law -0.070 -0.221   
 (0.529) (0.288)   
French-origin   -0.220 0.407 
   (0.548) (0.309) 
German-origin   0.827 0.182 
   (0.542) (0.379) 
Scandinavian-origin   5.311*** 0.677 
   (1.107) (0.511) 
Common Law * Rule 
of Law 
0.020**    
 (0.009)    
Rule of Law * German-
origin 
  -0.038***  
   (0.008)  
Rule of Law * 
Scandinavian 
  -0.124***  
   (0.021)  
Investor Protection * 
French-origin 
   -0.736* 
    (0.403) 
Observations 6,851 6,851 6,851 6,851 
Adjusted R2 0.088 0.085 0.096 0.087 
F Statistic 
56.258*** (df = 
12; 6838) 
80.461*** (df = 
8; 6842) 
34.082*** (df = 
22; 6828) 
47.700*** (df = 
14; 6836) 
Significance levels *p**p***p<0.01 
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The table shows the results from OLS regression of the dependent variable fraction of stock as a percentage of 
total compensation on different variables for investor protection and control variables. A dummy for common 
law countries is included as well as interaction terms with the explanatory variables for investor protection in 
columns 1 and 2. Dummy variables and interaction terms for the different law origins are included in columns 3 
and 4. Columns 1 and 3 use the three measurements of investor protection, while columns 2 and 4 use the 
composite.  
Results  
In this section of the analysis, we test if investor protection impacts the method of payment 
differently in the various law origins. Control variables and interaction terms that are not 
significant are not presented in the regression table. The fitted models obtain adjusted 𝑅2 
values of 8.8 %, 8.5 %, 9.6 %, and 8.7 %, respectively. Furthermore, the f-Statistic for all 
models is significant at the 1 % level. 
The variable mandatory dividends has a positive coefficient and is significant at the 5 % level 
in model 3. Mandatory dividends, according to La Porta et al. (1998), is meant as a legal 
substitute in the absence of other protections for shareholders. The positive coefficient of the 
variable mandatory dividends supports our hypothesis since mandatory dividends are meant 
to support minority shareholders in nations with weaker investor protection. The results can 
be interpreted as a 1 % increase in mandatory dividends will lead to an increase in the fraction 
of stock in considerations by 0.34 %.  
In column 1, the standalone variable shareholder rights is significant at the 5 % level and has 
a positive coefficient. This supports our hypothesis that higher levels of investor protection in 
the country of the acquiror increase target shareholders' propensity to accept stock as a form 
of compensation. It indicates that investor protection affects the method of payment in civil 
law countries.  
The variable investor protection has a positive coefficient and is statistically significant at the 
10 % level in column 4. The coefficient indicates that a 1 % increase in investor protection 
increases the fraction of stock as part of considerations by 0.516 %.  
Rule of law has a negative coefficient and is significant at the 5 % level. The negative 
coefficient for rule of law indicates that an improvement in rights for minority shareholders in 
civil law countries will lead to a lower willingness to accept stock instead of cash by 1.4 % for 
a one-unit increase.  
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The effect is the opposite for common law countries. In column 1, the interactive term common 
law * rule of law has a positive coefficient and is significant at the 5 % level. The interaction 
term common law * rule of law indicates that investor protection has a positive effect in 
common law countries compared to civil law countries. The coefficient indicates that the net 
effect for common law countries is positive as opposed to civil law countries, where the effect 
of rule of law is negative. The results are surprising and against our economic intuition.  
We believed that a strengthening of investor protection would have a positive effect on 
payment method in countries with weak investor protection rather than countries with strong 
investor protection. However, there might be other major differences between the models that 
we are unable to capture in the model, such as the efficiency of capital markets. 
In column 3, the dummy variable for Scandinavian-origin countries has a positive coefficient 
and is significant at the 1 % level. The abnormally large coefficient is likely due to a small 
sample size for Scandinavian transactions. When introducing the interaction variable 
Scandinavian * rule of law, the coefficient turns negative. This indicates that Scandinavian 
countries have a higher propensity to use stock in transactions. However, the effect diminishes 
when taking rule of law into account.  
The two interaction variables for rule of law combined with dummies for German-origin 
countries and Scandinavian-origin countries both have negative coefficients and are 
significant at the 1 % level. This indicates that a one-unit increase in rule of law in the German 
and Scandinavian legal origin countries decreases the fraction of stock as part of 
considerations with 3.8 % and 12.4 %, respectively.  
In column 2, only the interaction term investor protection * French-origin is statistically 
significant. This indicates that investor protection has a smaller impact on the fraction of stock 
as part of considerations in French civil law countries. The coefficient indicates that a one per 
cent increase in investor protection for French-origin countries leads to a 0.65 % decrease in 
the fraction of stock as method of payment compared to English-origin countries. This is 
against our economic intuition, similarly to the previous hypothesis comparing transactions 
with acquirors from common law countries and civil law countries. Comparably to common 
law versus civil law, there might be factors that the model is unable to capture that explains 
the variation in the data.  
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Using the probit model for robustness gives fairly similar results as the OLS model, though 
with a higher level of significance. See appendix 3 for the probit model. 
Columns 1, 3 and 4 have proxies for investor protection with statistically significant results, 
with positive coefficients. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis, which supports our 
alternative hypothesis that the use of stock as payment in takeovers increases with the level of 
investor protection in the acquiring nation, also when controlling for legal origins. The 
regression also indicates that the effect is stronger for common law countries. However, the 
regressions show relatively low values for adjusted 𝑅2 indicating that there are other effects 
















6.2.3 Cross-border and cross-industry effects 
Table 7 
Effects of investor protection on method of payment 
             Cross-border            Cross-industry 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Shareholder Rights 0.017  0.049***  
 (0.016)  (0.017)  
Rule of Law -0.003  -0.006  
 (0.005)  (0.004)  
Accounting Standards 0.001   0.004  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  
Investor Protection  0.075  0.445** 
  (0.161)  (0.186) 
Cross-border -0.885*** -0.582***   
 (0.273) (0.142)   
Cross-industry   0.072 -0.114 
   (0.235) (0.144) 
Cross-border * 
Investor Protection 
 0.449***   
  (0.162)   
Cross-industry * Rule 
of Law 
  0.007*  




  -0.008**  
   (0.004)  
Observations 6,851 6,851 6,851 6,851 
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.120 0.095 0.092 
F Statistic 
73.205*** (df 
= 13; 6837) 
104.916*** (df 
= 9; 6841) 
60.756*** (df = 
12; 6838) 
77.974*** (df = 9; 
6841) 
Significance levels *p**p***p<0.01 
 
The table shows the results of the OLS regression of the dependent variable fraction of stock as a percentage of 
total compensation on different variables for investor protection and control variables. Columns 1 and 3 use the 
three measurements of investor protection, while columns 2 and 4 use the investor protection composite. A 
dummy variable for cross-border transactions as well as interaction terms with the dummy is included in columns 
1 and 2. The dummy variable is based on SIC industry sector codes. Columns 3 and 4 use a dummy variable for 
cross-industry transactions and interaction terms with the dummy variable.  
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Results 
In this section of the analysis, we aim to see if investor protection affects method of payment 
differently in cross-border and cross-industry transactions. Control variables are included but 
not presented in the table. The fitted models obtain adjusted 𝑅2 values of 12.1 %, 12 %, 9.5 
%, and 9.2 %, respectively. Furthermore, the f-Statistics are significant at the 1 % level.  
The variable shareholder rights is statistically significant at the 1 % level in column 3. The 
coefficient indicates that a one-unit increase in shareholder rights in the nation of the acquiror 
increases the fraction of stock in transactions by 4.9 %.  
We see that the investor protection composite is positive and statistically significant at the 5 
% level in column 4. The coefficient indicates that a 1 % increase in investor protection in the 
nation of the acquiror increases the fraction of stock in transactions by 0.445 %.  
The dummy variable for cross-border transactions has negative coefficients and is statistically 
significant for model 1 and 2 at the 1 % level. This indicates that target shareholders have a 
lower propensity to accept stock as payment if the acquiror is from a different country. The 
coefficients measure the effect to be -88.5 % and -58.2 %, respectively. These findings align 
with the findings of Dutta et al. (2012), that companies tend to pay with more cash in cross-
border transactions.  
The interaction variable for cross-border transactions and investor protection has a positive 
coefficient and is statistically significant at the 1 % level in column 2. The coefficient indicates 
that a 1 % increase in investor protection will lead to a 0.449 % higher increase in the fraction 
stock as part of considerations in cross-border transactions compared to domestic. The 
observed net effect of investor protection combined with cross-border transactions indicates 
that target shareholders prefer to be paid in cash.  
The interaction variable for cross-industry transactions and rule of law has a positive 
coefficient and is statistically significant at the 10 % level in column 3. The coefficient 
indicates that a one-unit increase in investor protection will lead to a 0.7 % higher increase in 
the fraction stock as part of considerations in cross-industry transactions compared to 
domestic. 
The interaction term cross-industry * accounting standards has a negative coefficient and is 
statistically significant at the 5 % level. The coefficient indicates that a one-unit increase in 
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accounting standards leads to a decrease in the fraction of stock as part of considerations of 
0.8 % compared to intra-industry transactions.  
Columns 1 and 2 have proxies for investor protection with insignificant results. We, therefore, 
fail to reject the null hypothesis for these models. However, columns 3 and 4 have proxies for 
investor protection with statistically significant results, with positive coefficients. The fitted 
model rejects the null hypothesis, which supports our alternative hypothesis that the use of 
stock as payment in takeovers increases with the level of shareholder protection, also when 
controlling for cross-industry transaction. Although models 1 and 2 does not obtain 
statistically significant results, the interaction term in column 2 indicates a positive 
relationship between investor protection and stock fraction in cross-border transactions. This 
aligns with our intuition that targets pay closer attention to judicial risks when considering 
merging with an acquiring company from a different country. Consequently, target 
shareholders will accept a higher fraction of stock if the acquiror nation has better investor 
protection. 
The probit model used for robustness gives similar results as the OLS model. The probit table 













The purpose of this thesis was to expand on the existing investor protection literature. This 
was done by looking at investor protection's impact on target shareholders' payment method 
preference in takeovers. We propose that target shareholders' have a greater preference for 
cash when faced with increased uncertainty. Greater uncertainty is related to the risk of 
expropriation of minority shareholders, which is shown to be higher in countries with worse 
investor protection (La Porta et al. 1998). 
In this paper, we introduced the variables for shareholder rights and rule of law used by La 
Porta et al. (1998). Using their framework as a starting point, we analysed the potential impact 
on payment method in takeovers. In sum, the results show a positive relationship between 
increased levels of investor protection in the country of the acquiror and a greater propensity 
to use stock as method of payment in takeovers. The investor protection composite and 
shareholder rights variables are both significant, which supports our hypothesis.  
Our findings also indicate that targets prefer to be paid with cash in cross-border transactions. 
This aligns with previous literature by Faccio and Masulis (2005), that cash-financed 
transactions are more frequent in cross-border deals. Furthermore, this incentivises targets to 
accept a higher fraction of stock where the country of the acquiror has better investor 
protection. Although target shareholders' prefer to be paid in cash in cross-border transactions, 
we find that higher levels of investor protection positively affect the fraction of stock in these 
transactions. 
There are, however, limitations to our thesis. Throughout the analysis, we assume that the laws 
and different proxies of investor protection used in La Porta (1998) are applicable over a longer 
time period. In terms of the future direction of research, it would therefore be interesting to 
include significant changes in proxies for investor protection to see the effects on method of 
payment. This can illuminate the potential effect of legal changes in countries.  
The results of our thesis can help guide bidders to better understand the preferences of target 
shareholders, which can increase the likelihood of a successful acquisition and an optimal 
financing structure. Additionally, lawmakers can add our findings to the list of reasons why 
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Variable name Variable definition 
Shareholder rights An equal weight composite of the different 
shareholder rights variables as discussed in 4.5.1 
ranked from 0 to 6 
Rule of law An equal weight composite of the different rule 
of law variables as discussed in 4.5.2 ranked 
from 0 to 50 
Accounting standards Accounting standards of the countries as 
described in 4.5.3, ranked between 0 to 100 
Investor protection Composite variable made up of 6/12 * 
Shareholder rights, 5/12 * Rule of law and 1/12 
accounting standards, benchmarked to between 0 
to 1 
Mandatory dividends Legal rule that requires companies to pay a 
specific percentage of net income to 
shareholders in dividends 
Transaction value/enterprise value Transaction value divided by enterprise value of 
acquiror, the relative size of the acquisition 
compared to the acquiror 
Cash/assets Cash of acquiror divided by acquiror assets 
Debt/assets Debt of acquiror divided by acquiror assets 
Market/book Market value of acquiror divided by acquiror 
book value 
Offer premium Offer premium in the acquisition 
Dividend Dividend dummy, equal to 1 if target paid 
dividend in the last year 
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Common law Dummy variable, equal to 1 in if the acquiror is 
from an English-origin, common law country 
French-origin Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the acquiror is 
from a French-origin country 
German-origin Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the acquiror is 
from a German-origin country 
Scandinavian-origin Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the acquiror is 
from a Scandinavian-origin country 
Cross-border Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the acquiror is 
from a different country than the target  
Cross-industry Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the acquiror is 
from a different industry than the target based on 
SIC industry sector codes 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Effects of investor protection on method of payment – Legal origins – Probit 
 Common vs civil law         Origins 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mandatory dividends      0.997** 0.478 
    (0.484) (0.559) 
Rule of law -0.035***  0.019  
 (0.012)  (0.016)  
Accounting Standards 0.018**  -0.025  
 (0.009)  (0.022)  
Investor Protection  0.371  1.577** 
  (0.526)  (0.795) 
German-origin   3.025* 0.573 
   (1.633) (1.016) 
Scandinavian-origin   15.369*** 2.138 
   (2.956) (1.386) 
Rule of law * German-origin   -0.111***  
   (0.021)  
Rule of law * Scandinavian-origin   -0.365***  
   (0.065)  
Accounting Standards * Scandinavian-
origin 
  0.037*  
   (0.021)  
Common law * Rule of law 0.058***    
 (0.020)    
Common law * Accounting Standards -0.040*    
 (0.023)    
Investor Protection * French-origin    -2.079* 
    (1.152) 
Investor Protection * Scandinavian-origin    -3.209* 
    (1.806) 
Observations 6,040 6,040 6,040 6,040 
McFadden 𝑅2 0.080 0.076 0.087 0.077 
Significance levels *p**p***p<0.01 
 






Effects of investor protection on method of payment – Cross-border and cross-industry – 
Probit 
 Cross-border Cross-industry 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Shareholder rights 0.065  0.156***  
 (0.044)  (0.049)  
Rule of law -0.006  -0.016  
 (0.014)  (0.011)  
Accounting Standards -0.0003  0.009  
 (0.014)  (0.013)  
Investor Protection  0.311  1.321** 
  (0.463)  (0.532) 
Cross-border -3.028*** -1.889***   
 (1.029) (0.481)   
Cross-industry   0.351 -0.281 
   (0.712) (0.430) 
Cross-border * Investor Protection  1.476***   
  (0.553)   
Cross-industry * Rule of law   0.021*  
   (0.012)  
Cross-industry * Accounting Standards   -0.024**  
   (0.011)  
Observations 6,040 6,040 6,040 6,040 
McFadden 𝑅2 0.108 0.107 0.084 0.081 
Significance levels *p**p***p<0.01 
 












Effects of investor protection on method of payment – Excluding US 
 OLS       OLS     Probit     OLS      Probit 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Shareholder Rights 0.066** 0.065*** 0.191***   
 (0.027) (0.022) (-0.065)   
Rule of law -0.003 -0.00001 -0.001   
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.012)   
Accounting 
Standards 
0.002 -0.002 -0.007   
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.012)   
Investor Protection    0.521** 1.433** 




 0.341*** 1.114*** 0.339*** 1.107*** 
  (0.045) (0.127) (0.047) (0.135) 
Cash/Assets  -0.066 -0.143 -0.061 -0.123 
  (0.058) (0.186) (0.059) (0.186) 
Debt/Assets  0.046 0.161 0.067 0.231 
  (0.112) (0.330) (0.108) (0.311) 
Market/Book  0.0002 0.001 0.0002 0.001* 
  (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0004) 
Offer Premium  -0.074*** -0.215*** -0.078** -0.223** 
  (0.026) (0.090) (0.028) (0.094) 
Dividend  -0.045 -0.146 -0.045 -0.145 
  (0.046) (0.145) (0.047) (0.144) 
Observations 3,585 3,585 3,250 3,585 3,250 
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.113  0.108  
McFadden R2   0.094  0.091 
F Statistic 
33.793*** 
(df = 3; 
3581) 
51.650*** (df 
= 9; 3575) 
 63.119
*** (df 
= 7; 3577) 
 
Significance levels *p**p***p<0.01 
 
The table complements table 5 in section 6.2.1 and shows the effects of investor protection on 
the method of payment when excluding the US acquirors. 
